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ACT OF SEARCHING SUSPECTED SHOPLIFTER HELD
SLANDEROUS
Bennett v. Norban
396 Pa. 94, 151 A.2d 476 (1959)
After leaving defendant's self-service store, plaintiff was overtaken
near the entrance by the store's assistant manager who, erroneously suspect-
ing her of shoplifting, physically blocked her path and angrily ordered her
to remove her coat. He searched it, her purse, and the pockets of her dress;
and, finding nothing, returned to the store. Passers-by had gathered to
watch this incident to plaintiff's great distress and humiliation. Reversing
the lower court's order sustaining objections to the counts of slander and
invasion of privacy, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that defendant
should answer on both counts.1
Ordinarily, slander is defined as the spoken publication of defamatory
matter.2 The inherent unjustness of this definition is its exclusion of acts
and gestures which, unaccompained by any defamatory words, nevertheless
convey a defamatory meaning. However, this delusive definition is likely
to persist as long as there is such a dearth of authority on this subject.3
Had the implication of the assistant manager's conduct in the instant
case4 been verbally expressed, it would have constituted slander per se ac-
cording to the law of most states, including Ohio.5 The term slander per
se designates those defamatory charges which, because of their serious na-
ture, are presumed by law to cause injury, thus obviating the necessity of
proving actual damage.8
The prevention of defamation and the remedying of injuries, caused by
1 The existence of the right of privacy has been recognized only recently in Ohio.
Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956). This case has been noted in
17 Ohio St. L.J. 346 (1956). Also see 22 Ga. B.J. 247 (1959) for a casenote on the
invasion of privacy count of the instant case. See generally 77 C.J.S. "Right of Privacy"
§ 1 et seq. (1952); 41 Am. Jur. "Privacy" § 1 et seq. (1942); 32 Ohio Jur. "Privacy" §
1 et seq. (1934).
2 See e.g., 33 Am. Jur. "Libel and Slander" §'55 (1941); 53 C.J.S. "Libel and
Slander" § 1 (1948); 34 Ohio Jur. 2d "Libel and Slander" § 2 (1958); 39 Words and
Phrases 486 (1953).
3 Even the instant case failed to cite any case authority that has held defamatory
acts or gestures slanderous.
4 The court stated that the entire incident suffered by the plaintiff was "... a
dramatic pantomime suggesting to the assembled crowd that appellant was a thief."
Bennett v. Norban, 396 Pa. 94, 98, 151 A.2d 476, 478 (1959).
5 Simpson v. Pitman, 13 Ohio 365 (18W); Haines v. Welling, 7 Ohio 253 (1835);
Cheadle v. Buell, 6 Ohio 67 (1833); Seaton v. Cordray, Wright 101 (Ohio 1832);
Hughey v. Bradrick, 39 Ohio App. 486, 177 N.E. 911 (1931); Reinhardt v. Faschnacht,
4 Ohio C.C.R. 321, 2 Ohio C.C. Dec. 571 (Ct. App. 1890); Tedtman v. Hancock, 1
Ohio .C.C.R. 238, 1 Ohio C.C. Dec. 129 (Ct. App. 1885). See e.g., 53 C.J.S. "Libel
and Slander" § 70 (1948); 33 Am. Jur. "Libel and Slander" § 31 (1941).
6 See e.g., 53 C.J.S. "Libel and Slander" § 8 (1948).
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
the publication of false and defamatory matter; to one's pecuniary interests,7
to one's freedom of social intercourse,8 and to one's reputation 9 are all
avowed purposes of a defamation action. But these rights may be violated
by acts as well as by words; so, unless there is some compelling reason for
tolerating such injuries when caused by acts, they should be actionable.
Perhaps the inherent difficulty in ascertaining the meaning of acts justifies
such toleration. This difficulty could lead to the misinterpretation of innocent
acts with a consequent undue restriction on our freedom of action. However,
this danger is very slight since the court would determine, as in the case of
words,' 0 if the acts convey a meaning so unambiguous as to be actionable
per se or per quod; or whether they are susceptible of a sufficient defama-
tory meaning to present a jury question. Acts may convey precisely the
same defamatory meaning as words, and where the acts clearly convey a
charge of larceny, as in the instant case, they should be held slanderous
per se.
There is both United States". and foreign' 2 secondary authority for
following the ancient Roman 13 and English 14 rule that defamatory acts,
unaccompanied by any defamatory words, are actionable. For instance,
7 G. M. McKelvey Co. v. Nanson, 5 Ohio App. 73, 24 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 314 (Ct.
App. 1915).
8 Kaucher v. Blinn, 29 Ohio St. 62 (1875); Beatty v. Baston, 13 Ohio L. Abs.
4S1 (Ct. App. 1932); McKean v. Folden, 2 Ohio Dec. Reprint 248 (C.P. 1859) (dictum).
9 Alfele v. Wright, 17 Ohio St. 238 (1867); Malone v. Stewart, 15 Ohio 319
(1846); Simpson v. Pitman, supra note 5; Haines v. Welling, supra note 5; Cheadle v.
Buell, supra note 5; Rollins v. Pennock, 2 Ohio Dec. Reprint 735 (C.P. 1862); Motley v.
Gombos, 78 Ohio L. Abs. 546, 153 N.E.2d 465 (C.P. 1958).
3o Becker v. Toulmin, 165 Ohio St. 549, 138 N.E.2d 391 (1956).
11 Restatement, Torts, § 568 (1938). "Slander consists of the publication of de-
famatory matter by spoken words, transitory gestures, or by any form of communica-
tion other than those stated in subsection (1).", which defined libel.
12 See Schultz v. Frankfort Marine Accident and Plate Glass Ins. Co., 151 Wis. 537,
139 N.W. 386 (1913); Svendsen v. State Bank of Duluth, 64 Minn. 40, 65 N.W. 1086
(1896). But see Collins v. Oklahoma State Hospital, 76 Okla. 229, 184 Pac. 946 (1916),
where the acts of certain hospital employees in placing a white patient in the part of
the institution set apart and used for colored patients was held not to be libelous even
though it would have been libelous per se to have written that a white person was
colored. However, the result of this case seems to have been due to the court's use
of the ejusde-m generis rule in strictly construing the Oklahoma statute defining libel.
S Cornell L.Q. 340 (1920).
13 Newell, Slander and Libel 12 et seq. (3d ed. 1914). The following are three
examples of defamatory acts in the Roman law as listed by Newell: 1. Forcing your
way into the house of another. 2. Persistenly following a matron, or a young girl
respectably dressed, as being an imputation of unchastity. 3. Needlessly fleeing to the
emperor's statue for refuge, making it appear that someone was oppressing you.
14 See De Libellis Famosis, 5 Co. Rep. 125a, 77 Eng. Rep. 250 (1606); Rex v.
Roberts, 3 Keb (Eng.) 378 (1675); Austin v. Culpepper, 2 Show K.B. 313 (1674);
Mason v. Jennings, T. Raymond (Eng.) 401 (1680); Plunket v. Gilmore, Fortescue
(Eng.) 211 (1725); Jefferies v. Duncombe, 11 East (Eng.) 226 (1809); Eyre v. Garlick,
42 J.P. 68 (1878).
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the act of a banker in returning a merchant's check through a clearing
house to the holder when the merchant had sufficient funds in the bank to
pay the check has been held slanderous per se.15 Also, the continuous open
or rough shadowing of a person by two private detectives so as to publicly
proclaim him a suspect has been held a libel.16
Ohio has been mute on whether defamatory acts are actionable; 17 but
assuming they are, the Ohio shopkeeper may be able to avoid personal
liability for such acts in certain situations. The Ohio temporary detention
of suspected shoplifters statute 8 permits a merchant who reasonably sus-
pects one of shoplifting to detain such a person in a reasonable manner for
a reasonable time in order to obtain a warrant for such person's arrest. In
the present case, however, the assistant manager searched the plaintiff
against her will in the presence of third parties rather than merely detaining
her in a reasonable manner. His conduct would not be within the purview
of the Ohio statute.
In summary, defamatory acts should be actionable because the rights
protected by a defamation action may be violated by acts as well as by
words. Foreign precedent supports holding them actionable. The only
contra argument-the danger of misinterpreting the meaning of acts--is
unconvincing because of the court's control over the jury. Therefore, a dis-
tinction should not be made between acts and words which convey a similar
defamatory meaning.
Arthur R. Pulskamp
15 Svendsen v. State Bank of Duluth, supra note 12.
16 Schultz v. Frankfort Marine Accident and Plate Glass Ins. Co., supra note 12.
But see Molt v. Public Indemnity Co., 10 N.J. Misc. 879, 161 Ad. 346 (Super. Ct
1932) where the judge in referring to the Schultz case, supra, said that he thought it
was a case of continuous slander rather than libel.
17 But cf. Lakin v. Gun, Wright 14 (Ohio 1831). Although acts, rather than
words, were involved in this case, it cannot be said that defamatory acts were held
non-actionable as such, because the opinion's Aesopian language supports conflicting
reasons for the Ohio Supreme Court's sustaining of the defendant's demurrer.
18 Ohio Rev. Code § 2935.041 (1957).
